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SUMMARY
A thorough review has been made of the Advanced Transport
Technologies (ATT) studies performed by three airframe manufacturers.
Because of the nature of the material presented and the need for a
common denominator, economics plays a major role. Although economics
was not the only factor examined, it was the main factor used here to
summarize the potential benefits of applying advanced technologies
because of its importance in commercial air transportation.
There was found to be a potential benefit accruing to the
primary technology areas investigated. In defining this potential,
American Airlines used only economic and design data emanating from the
General Dynamics studies, at the instruction of NASA-Langley. However,
the economics and designs of the other two contractors, the Boeing
Company and Lockheed-Georgia were also evaluated.
The profit potential was obtained by isolating the appropriate
technology area and measuring the margin over conventional technology
generated by inclusion of that element. A relative ranking could be
obtained by applying this measure against a present technology aircraft
having a 195 seat configuration. It is stressed, however, that this
study is based upon certain assumptions (see Figure 7A & 7B) which would
have to be adhered to for such a comparison. The profit margin impact
places the following values on the technology areas reviewed.
PROFIT MARGIN IMPACT
(Passenger Load Factor - 50%)
1972 $
Primary Technology Areas
o AIRFRAME
Composite Structure (1972 Engine)
Composite Structure (1978 Engine)
Composite Structure (1982 Engine)
Supercritical Airfoil (Alum AF)
Active Control System (Alum AF)
Active Control System (G/E AF)
Profit Margin Impact
A c/RPM
0.4092
0.4304
0.4188
0.3820
0.0740
0.0560
o ENGINE
Present Technology Airframe Materials
Advanced Engine 1978
Advanced Engine 1982
Advanced Technology Airframe Materials
Advanced Engine 1978
Advanced Engine 1982
(0.0368)*
0.2632
(0.0348)
0.2536
(*) Denotes Decrease.
An engine technology impact was also reviewed to complete the
study even though this was not part of American Airlines' task. It was
felt that this element was essential to make a meaningful assessment of
the effect of other advanced technologies.
One of the major impacts to the airline could be the effect of
increased speed. This was considered in great detail because, the
implication of a reduced number of aircraft with higher utilization posed
a potential benefit. Several steps were taken from the general effect
•\
of increased speed, to the integration of a 0.98 Mach aircraft into
American Airlines' route network. It was found that the potential
benefits were only small improvements in scheduling flexibility, with
no elimination of aircraft from the fleet or added scheduled trips
(increased utilization).
An operational cost study was performed using American Airlines
data to determine where future advanced technology research should be
focused. The basic elements of cost were examined to focus on the origin
and magnitude of airfraine related expenses. This was accomplished to
establish a priority of future study areas. The high operating cost
areas were found to be Systems, Secondary Power and Landing Gear. The
latter points out a fundamental part of the airframe that has been
overlooked from a cost point of view, as designs have progressed.
Finally, the manufacturers' underlying postulate as to the
economic value of. any particular technology, and the changeiin value
attributed to substitution, is a costing methodology predicated
primarily on acquisition price and weight. This costing approach has
not been found to be representative. The theory that small cost
changes (derived by formula) were reflective of the technology introduced,
however, was accepted and formed the foundation upon which American
Airlines assessed the profit impact. It was concluded that future
economic evaluations will require better methods to assess ope rational
costs.
INTRODUCTION
Almost without exception, agreement can be found about the
role Technology has played in the commercial aircraft sector of the
United States economy. Also, there would be agreement that investment
in any technology for future use is warranted. The spending of funds
in the area of technology for future period utilization is in a way
the investment in an asset. As in any exploration into "asset worth"
past and present, measurable quantities are used in an attempt to, as
precisely as possible, determine future utility. In the case of
commercial aircraft, the air carriers study the past performance of
their fleets and the benefits that may have accrued from designs
peculiar to a specific vehicle model.
Accordingly, American Airlines has used past and near term
hisotry of its inventory of aircraft to consider the factors upon
which three contractors (The Boeing Company, General Dynamics and
Lockheed) have projected benefits resulting from certain technologies.
American Airlines has evaluated the conceptual differences
in design and' economics in light of their past experience. We have
recognized the objective to assess the benefit that may result from
expenditures for research and development in the various technology
areas presented and maintained an objective stance. Internal records
were used to substantiate positions taken. It was not our objective
to prove or disprove any of the contractor's work but to provide NASA
a perspective from a potential owner of the next generation aircraft.
In this regard, American Airlines presents this report as a continuing
stimulus for careful detail study of technology advancement that
can be banked for future utility.
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ASSESSMENT
o ATT CANDIDATES
Basically, the job of reviewing the ATT designs is one of (a)
determining the characteristics and then (b) determining their worth to
the ultimate buyers. Before these two determinations could be made,
much information had to be accumulated, organized, analyzed, and
interpreted. A logical starting point was to examine the objectives and
then to compare the results. Each of the Phase II designs had a set of
conditions within which the manufacturers worked. The comments by
American Airlines are made cognizant of these limitations.
Each of the contractors (TBC, GDFW and GIAC) produced designs
that appeared to meet all NASA outlined design objectives. Each
contractor arrived at their resultant positions by narrowing the
elements of design through the use of economic considerations. The
airframe considerations embraced essentially four different categories
of "technologies" — supercritical aerodynamics, composite materials,
active control systems, and to a lesser degree, the effect of
propulsion technology; The categories were studied to assess their
economic value, using an approach that combined physical characteristics
(i.e., weight, size, CL, Cp, thrust, etc.) with an approximation of
operational expenses, and return on investment. The economic considera-
tions were predicated primarily upon weight and price. It shall be
the approach within this report, to first summarize the physical and
then the economic interpretations.
o OPERATIONAL ENVELOPE
Each of the Phase II candidates have the general design
features contained in Table 1. The space limit payload values shown,
were determined using standard American Airlines unit weight and
density relationships. A comparison was made of these with conventional
fleets. To be commercially saleable to a U.S. or foreign air carrier,
it is believed that an ATT aircraft will have, at least, to meet present
standards.
The ATT aircraft all fall within the payload range envelopes
of "conventional technology" aircraft. To go beyond present aircraft in
payload or range was not the purpose of the ATT work. It is mentioned
because future aircraft will be required to show better efficiency,
by some measure, to make them a viable product when compared to present
equipment. In this regard, there are certain design features that
should be mentioned.
o PAYLOAD
All designs were found to be structurally limited. If the
volume available were filled with a nominal density of 160 Kg/M3 (10 lb./ft.3),
the weight of the aircraft would go beyond the design structural
capability. A commercial vehicle would not be acceptable to an air
carrier under these constraints. Even if the margin between the volume
and structural limit were zero or small, it is doubtful if the aircraft
would be considered acceptable. There are two reasons for the
unacceptability of zero or negative payload margins. The first and most
obvious is the limitation of payload. If the aircraft were limited to
something below its volume (space) limit, an air carrier would be
initially "handicapped." When in service, the operator would have to
make a trade between carrying cargo, passengers, or some limited combina-
tion of both. This relationship is best illustrated in Figure 3. It
can be argued that 160 Kg/M3 (10 lb./ft.3) is not a norm. If the cargo
density were allowed to "float" a comparison can be made of the
resultant limiting value. At a 100% passenger load, the density available
for cargo and baggage is shown in Table 2. As illustrated, the ATT air-
craft do not meet what is considered a minimum standard for belly cargo.
The second reason for establishing a margin is for "operational
growth" which occurs in all aircraft. Although commercial carriers do not
normally operate at the space or structural limit, a margin is required to
allow for the ^erosi"bir.:>of payload capability. An aircraft' sVempty opera-
ting weight (EOW) increases with time, usually the result of in-service
modifications. As the EOW increases, the structural payload limit (MZFGW -
EOW) decreases. If there is no margin, the carrier is faced with an in-
efficient aircraft from the standpoint of excess volume that cannot be
filled. Table 3 illustrates the growth that AA has experienced in its'
fleets. The ATT study aircraft have an initial limitation.
0
 MATERIALS
Since all ATT designs used varying degrees of composite mat-
erials, an overall indicator or measure of efficiency was constructed
using the structural payload limit. A yardstick by which to measure
and compare the ATT composite structures to conventional construction,
is the ratio of the maximum structural limited payload to the empty
operating weight (STRLIM P.L./EOW). This ratio is shown for both the
ATT candidates and conventional aircraft in Figure 4. The ratios for
the ATT vehicles were expected to exceed present technology aircraft.
This did not occur. A target of increased speed and lower noise may
be the underlying cause for being essentially equivalent to conven-
tional aircraft by this measure. It was noted that as the design cruise
speed increased, the PL/EOW decreases (see Figure 4). From the strength
to weight ratios of composites, it would logically follow that greater
payloads should be available at equivalent empty weights. One conclusion
is that there has been no deterioration in the payload available due to
noise penalties as a direct result or effect of advanced tachnologies ,
since noise reduction is apparently a major contributor to increased
weight.
Throughout the tables and figures mentioned, there has been
an exception noted. In the GDFW values, a 1.5 multiplier (1.5 Psgr.
P.L. = STR. PL) was reportedly used to establish the structural design
limits. This appeared to be an arbitrary definition of structural pay-
load which differs from a conventional weight build-up number. It was
not clear, from all theonaterial presented, how the payload limit (STRLIM.
P.L.) was actually derived. So as not to dwell an unproportionate length
of time on this subject, both values are shown for the reader's review.
Supercritical aerodynamics offer improvements in weight,
through thicker, lighter wings and/or higher cruise speeds with potential
increases in ''range. The design objective would dictate the trade-offs
to be made. The only problem area (and this is not exclusively aero-
dynamic) may be the cruise speed itself. If a supercritical wing is
chosen for the Mach range of 0.95 and above, the required dive speed,
for present FAR required safety margins, would be supersonic. This
could require additional systems (stability augmentations, Mach trim
devices, airspeed system etc.) and higher than conventional economic
burden. The dive Mach numbers (Mp) of the ATT aircraft are compared
to present in-service aircraft in Table 4.
o AREA-RULING
Fuselage area-ruling is required for the higher cruise Mach
speed of 0.95 and above. The potential problem with a marketable com-
mercial aircraft is its flexibility to fill the needs of a variety of
air carriers. In this regard, the concept of a family of aircraft,
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such as for each of the 707, DC-8, DC-9, and 727 types, when applied
to area-ruled airplanes, may require a resizing of the vehicle. Simply
adding a fuselage section for dimensional growth may not be feasible if
the aircraft has to be re-optimized. Area ruling also produces a much
less flexible cabin and belly cargo design.
0
 TIME SAVINGS
The higher speeds brought about by supercritical wing, area-
ruling, and composites, offer potential time savings. A theoretical
time savings, when compared to a 0.84 Mach cruise aircraft, is about
14 and 39 minutes for 0.90 and 0.98 Mach cruise aircraft, respectively,
over a transcontinental range (JFK-LAX). Over a longer range, such as
JFK-HNL, the time differentials are 39 and 99 minutes.for the two
aforementioned cruise speeds. This potential is reduced considerably
over a segmented route network by two factors: (a) en route delays and
(b) average trip lengths. The ramp-to-ramp times are increased for
delays associated with ground taxi, winds, en route flight plan changes,
time-of-day of departure or arrival, ground tracks and season of the
year. Two aircraft(-with the same cruise speed can have different
schedules times. Conversely, aircraft with different cruise speeds may
have identical schedule times, depending on the effect of these items.
The other factor is the nominal trip length. Design ranges for the ATT
aircraft are about 5500 KM (3000 N.M.) and 9300 KM (5000 N.M.). If
these'represented averages over some hypothetical network, there would
be a potential time savings. In practice, however, average trip lengths
are far below design ranges. An example of this is the average stage
length for the 747 and DC-10, which was 2846 KM (1537 N.M.) and 1421 KM
(767 N.M.) - July 1973 for American Airlines' fleet, respectively.
These values represent distances less than half of their design range.
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It can, therefore, be seen that unless the average trip distance is what
can be considered long-range (5556 KM Plus) the potential time savings
deteriorates.
Since the speed advantage appeared to have the maximum
advantage at 0.98 Mach cruise, that speed was first selected for sched-
uling over selected routes. The scheduling analysis had three phases:
(a) theoretical fastest times, (b) 0.98 Mach cruise actual times, and
(c) a total scheduling exercise,
o FASTEST TIME
Several selected routes were used to compare a 0.82 Mach cruise
aircraft to a 0.98 Mach ATT aircraft. No restriction was made for range
limitations of the aircraft, for previously mentioned delays, or for
preferential departure times. It was an attempt to determine the maxi-
mum potential on an actual route flown by a 707-300 aircraft. For a two
day cycle, the time differential was 1:22 Hr:Min for a domestic schedule.
An international route system, with longer stage distances, resulted in
several time savings values depending upon the ground rules imposed. If
departure times were allowed to "float", with a restriction of leaving
Sydney (see Figure 5) in the morning after the locally imposed curfew,
there is a potential of 5:03 (JIr:Miii) savings. By turning the aircraft in
2 hours at Sydney, there is a potential time savings of 16:05 (pr:Mii$
within the approximate three day cycle. Eight hours of this time savings
results from the elimination of the curfew at Sydney. In theory, the 16
hour time differential could allow for an additional trip somewhere else.
It should be recognized that these schedules do not allow for special
maintenance or servicing problems that may exist, nor was there any
attempt to adhere to a prime departure time. Some departures could occur
at an undesirable time of day (e.g. 3 o'clock in the morning).
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0
 ACTUAL SCHEDULED TIME
For similar routes, a scheduling model was used with adjusted
ramp-to-ramp times. All normal ATC, ground delays, winds, servicing etc.,
were built into the 0.98 Mach cruise speed. An example of the schedule
computer output is displayed in Figure 6. Again the departure times were
allowed to "float" (no allowance for prime departure time). Marketing
considerations were not primary in this scheduling exercise because it
was still the objective to determine time savings potential. It was a
secondary objective to attempt to determine if the size of the fleet could
be reduced by increased utilization, thus reducing capital investment.
This was not the case.
0
 TOTAL SCHEDULING EXERCISE
The final step was to schedule the 0.98 Mach aircraft on a
domestic and international route network. Marketing considerations were
taken into account. The higher speed aircraft on actual AA route net-
works, resulted in scheduling flexibility but did not reduce the number
of aircraft nor did it result in additional trips. The routing charts
for both a domestic and international system are contained in Figures 7
and 8. These figures compare an ATT 0.98 Mach aircraft with conventional
technology aircraft and show the actual time differentials for a variety
of segments. These charts may appear somewhat complicated, however, they
represent actual schedules with "real world" considerations.
0
 COMMENT
One conclusion reached is that for a domestic network, where
the average trip length is small relative to the aircraft design range,
a 0.98 Mach aircraft has little advantage apart from some very slight
scheduling flexibility. On selected long range segments, there is a poten-
tial advantage with the higher speed aircraft. Finally, when the aircraft
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is integrated into a mix of present technology aircraft over a route
system used by American Airlines, there is an advantage in scheduling
flexibility but little or no change in the number of aircraft required.
The utilization does not in a practical sense, appear any greater with
the ATT 0.98 Mach aircraft.
FUEL CONSUMPTION
The fuel consumption of a fleet is dependent upon the- way an
aircraft is used. An example of a comparison of an international and
domestic operation is shown in Figure 9. To make a similar estimate for
the ATT aircraft was difficult because of the lack of "off design" per-
formance information. However, an estimate was made which is presented
in Figure 10. This is an attempt to show the range in which the ATT air-
craft migh€v.f all.-.1.From Figure 10, trades can be made by holding the
utilization of a conventional aircraft constant while changing it for the
ATT aircraft and determining the fuel consumption differences. Since the
comparisons could not be rigorously prepared from ATT off-design perfor-
mance data, they should be considered as boundaries rather than absolute
levels. A final example of the relative fuel burn, again using ATT
estimates, is shown in Figure 11/
0
 COMMENT
The conclusion reached is that the higher speeds are offset
by greater fuel consumption. An increase in utilization also can result
in higher daily consumption. If the higher speeds result in more daily
trips, a figure of merit is the fuel burn per seat mile. The following
index relates the relative position of the ATT aircraft with the present
technology 747. Approximately, the same ranking would occur if the DC-10
were used as a base.
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ATT FUEL RANKING
JFK-LAX
AIRCRAFT
747-100
707-300B
DC-10
TBC 640 .
TBC 630 .
TBC 620 .
GD/FW .90
GD/FW .98
GLAC .95
90M
95M
98M
SEATS GAL/ASl
380
138
254
195
195
195
195
195
398
0.0173
0.0272
0.0168
0.0171
0.0180
0.0192
0.0125
0.0139
0.0135
INDEX*
1.00
1.57
.97
.99
.04
,11
.72
.80
.79
1.
1.
* ATT/747 - GAL/ASM
Based on this comparison, there appears to be a gain in the
passenger carrying fuel economy of the GDFW and GLAC aircraft when com-
pared to the 747. The opposite is true for the TBC aircraft (with the
exception of the .90M). The reason for these results is primarily (or
so it would appear) decreased operating weights, although the aircraft
do represent an aggregate of ;adyancedgteehnologies:."s However, las noted
earlier, j. this'.is largely dependent on payload/empty weight fractions,
mostly brought about by greater use of composites. If the structural
payload-to-empty weight ratios developed earlier turn out to be optimistic,
then the fuel ranking index will change.
0
 MAINTENANCE
In general, the maintenance practices anticipated for ATT
will not change beyond the scope of today's system. In'zthe past, main-
tenance concepts have changed to reflect better and more economical pro-
cedures. ATT airplanes should be compatible with this form of evolution-
ary change. The ATT study did not provide an in-depth study of mainten-
ance practices so it was assumed that designs and materials used would
be equivalent to present aircraft. There is one area of concern, however,
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that requires further work by the airframe manufacturers. This area
comes under the general category of systems.
The ATT aircraft may introduce control systems that, although
similar to present aircraft, become critical to the operation of the
aircraft. Special stability augmentation or active control systems,
when made flight critical, require a different design philosophy. Back-
up systems in greater depth, will be required. It was not possible
from the work presented in the ATT contract studies, to render an opin-
ion as to the adequacy of system design or maintenance requirements.
It was, therefore, decided to look at present system costs and operation-
al problems. This was done in a brief manner by utilizing American'-s
internally generated index of system performance. The indicator is
called "Quality Level Index". In substance, the QLI reflects four
parameters (pilot reports, premature removals, aircraft delays and
trip cancellations) which indicate sub-system and fleet performance.
Only one portion of the index was used, that being the premature re-
movals, to better reflect the costs directly related to the system.
A sample of data was extracted from two general categories; Auto Flight
and Navigation. The sub-systems within these categories were analyzed
for the 707, 747 and DC-10 representing "past" and "present technologies".
Each sub-system has a number of "sub-components" that, in aggregate,
totaled 106. An indication of technology impact was considered to be
the relative position of the 747 and DC-10 to the earlier developed 707
aircraft. Both cost and removal rates were traced, the results of which
are shown in Figure 12.
The results reached indicate that the 747 and DC-10 had 237=,
and 607, percent fewer removals, respectively, for the auto-flight sys-
tem. The 747 and DC-10 fleets are, however, 357= and 547« the size of
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the 707 fleet; respectively. Therefore, the apparent "technology gain"
is somewhat diluted. The added dimension of cost produces another
measure of technology. The cost factor indicates the 747 and DC-10
to be 1.8 to 5.7 times as expensive to maintain on an hourly basis,
o COMMENT
The conclusion reached is that if additional systems are
required for an ATT type aircraft, an extensive study must be performed
to insure cost effectiveness.
Two of the contractor design approaches (GDFW and GLAC) had
a high usage of composites. The otheracontractor T(TBG) presented designs
that contained a lesser quantity of composites emphasizing the require-
ment for a phased intrpdVct±onMori'ATT;.i.a^ rcfaf^ (!Jut^ .all of the contractors
recommended a phased entry of composites through various programs). The
comments addressed here are reflective of the PHASE II designs. American
believes that a phased introduction is the only rational way to intro-
duce any radically new technology. In any event, there will be the
necessity to establish a good foundation of experience to reveal main-
tenance criteria. As in metal aircraft, standards will have to be
established for periodic inspections, repairs or replacements, response
to cyclic loading, sonic fatigue and other resultant behavior induced
from normal airline operations. To date, no extensive maintenance ex-
perience has been gained that resembles an air carrierJs environment.
The military has reported in a qualitative manner, that the components
in service indicate that they are cost competitive with conventional
structure. The data American Airlines has been able to gather only
superficially substantiates;,^ ! equal or lower maintenance cost. Until
more experience is gained under a high utilization condition, it is
impossible to predict the benefits, if any, to be gained in maintenance
cost savings from the use of composites.
17
0
 NOISE
. FAA is already on record as intending to lower the noise limits
of FAR 36 by 10 EPNdB. Recent EPA proposals for reducing aircraft and
airport noise (Federal Register, 19 February 1974; Item 6) reinforce this
suggestion. The prospect of stiffer noise regulations in the not too
distant future, whether in the form of the 3-point concept embodied in
FAR 36, or in somevother concept, is very real. Thus, the technologies
which must be brought to fruition to achieve lower ATT noise levels must
take account of the time period in which these airplanes might be intro-
duced. Simply put, it seems that ATT noise reductions for the acoustic
configurations given greatest emphasis by the manufacturers, corresponding
to FAR 36 minus 10 EPNdB, may not be enough if they are to be introduced
in a time period when other (conventional) aircraft have long since been
required to conform to that criterion. ATT configurations with somewhat
greater noise reductions (FAR 36 minus 15 EPNdB) were studied by the
manufacturers, but not to the same extent s-asXthelJ'minus ten" configurations.
In any event, it is not possible at this point in time to assert that minus
15 EPNdB would be a reasonable goal.
As previously reported, noise criteria should be neither unique
nor preferential for any "class" of aircraft with respect to permitting
it to be noisier (in airport communities) than any other class. Thus,
most, if not all of the noise constraints which could affect the design
and operation of ATT airplanes apply equally to other subsonic airplanes,
and in particular conventional long-haul airplanes. This means that
attention to power plant acoustic design features, e.g. bypass ratio,
fan tip speed, fan pressure ratio, jet exhaust velocity, blade-stator
spacing, etc., must receive the same attention for ATT installations
as for any other type of airplane. Similarly, the effect of sound sup-
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pression liners and inlet and duct splitters will have the same detri-
mental effects as far as airplane performance, weight, cost and operating
economics are concerned.
There was found a general lack of suitability of inlet rings
for noise reduction. This comes from increased risk of foreign object
damage, anti-icing requirements, increased weight and probable added
maintenance costs (more difficult access to the engine face, as well
as maintenance of the splitters themselves).
It was not possible, in this study program, to assess the
separate or cumulative effects of noise reduction design features since
none of the airplane contractors submitted data on a "with-and'without"
basis.
° F.A.R. AMENDMENTS
The work accomplished by American in the task of Recommenda-
tions for Amendments to Federal Aviation Regulations, addressed two
aspects of the immediate advanced transport technology program. The
first dealt with possible changes to the FAR's, applicable uniquely to
ATT aircraft, but not to other types. In both cases, the FAR's were
examined to see if specific recommendations for changes could be made,
and to identify areas in the FAR's which should be the subject of
further study by the NASA, FAA, or otheis to determine if changes are
required.
The list of FAR's called out in the following discussion may
not be complete. It was not possible to analyze in detail all the reg-
ulatory areas which affect the design and operation of transport category
airplanes. Nevertheless, the list is considered representative of areas
which should be considered candidates for study and/or possible change.
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Detailed study of applicable regulations could be the subject of NASA/
FAA/Manufacturer/Airline follow-on*work to identify areas in need of
improvement.
0
 CHANGES TO FAR's - Unique to ATT
A. Specific Changes
American's assessment of the design and operating character-
istics of the contractorsi? Phase II ATT designs, did not reveal
characteristics which were sufficiently different from those of
conventional aircraft to warrant specific recommended changes at
this time.
B. Further Study Suggested
Several areas in FAR 25, "Airworthiness Standards - Transport
Category Airplanes" appear to warrant further study to determine if
changes uniquely applicable to ATT airplanes are in order. In some
cases, changes may be dependent on the results of continued R&D on
the advanced technologies themselves (e.g. strength of composite
structures, etc.).
Some of the FAR's which may be unique to ATT designs and may
need to be changed after more study are:
1. FAR 25.143 through FAR 25.149; "Controllability and Maneuverability."
2. FAR 25.161 "Trim."
3. FAR 25.171 through FAR 25.181 "Stability."
4. FAR 25.335(b) "design Dive Speed, VD."
5. FAR 25.581(c) "Lightning Protection - Non-metallic Components."
6. FAR 25.867, "Fire Protection: Other Components."
7. FAR 25.631, "Bird Strike Damage."
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o CHANGES TO PAR'S - NOT UNIQUE TO ATT
Several regulatory areas relating to the design, certification
and operation of all CTOL transport aircraft appear to be in need of
immediate improvement. However, specific changes to these FAR's will
depend on further study and/or the outcome of experimental programs,
some of which are known to be underway at this time.
In any event, the introduction of a new class of aircraft (e.g.
ATT, SST, VTOL, etc.) particularly if it possesses unique characteristics
which set it apart from its predecessors, can serve as a convenient and
appropriate means of bringing about much needed improvement in some areas
of&the Federal Aviation Regulations as follows:
1. FAR 121.195, "Transport Category Airplanes: Turbine Engine
Powered: Landing Limitations: Destination Airports 1"
2. FAR 121.645, "Fuel Supply: Turbine Engine Powered
Airplanes, other than Turbo-Propeller: Flag and
Supplemental Air Carriers and Commercial Operators."
3. Advisory Circular, AC 33-IB, dated 4-22-70, "Turbine
Engine Foreign Object Ingestion and Rotor Blade Containment
Type Certification Procedures."
4. FAR 36, "Noise Standards; Aircraft Type Certification."
The general conclusion is that any amendment, being suggested,
would apply to the next generation aircraft whether or not it carries the
label of advanced technology.
o SECONDARY POWER SYSTEM
Review of Final Report - An Advanced Concept Secondary Power
System Study forAdvanced Transport Technology (Reference 7)
Four basic concepts or configurations were addressed in the
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first part of the subject study:
A. Configuration I - Shaft and Bleed Power offtake from the propulsion
engine which is the conventional approach.
B. Configuration II - Shaft Power Offtake only from the propulsion
engine.
C. Configuration III - Dedicated APU (APU provides all power required for
aircraft systems over the entire flight envelope.
D. Configuration IV - Internal Engine Generator (IEG) where all
^ secondary power is produced by an electrical
generator mounted internally within the engine.
Configuration I requires no particular comment and was adequately
treated. Configuration II, however, is directed at the use ofsshaft power
to raise fan discharge air to the required pressure for cabin pressuriza-
tion. American's concerns would be with the impact of erosion, compressor
efficiency achievable, etc., from such a small compressor unit, and
American would undoubtedly use 707 turbo compressor experience as a start-
ing point in any design review process. The turbo compressor which uses
engine bleed air to drive a turbine of the turbo compressor unit is
obviously different; but the compressor, controls, bearings and lubrication
elements would be the common starting point. None of these items were
particularly outstanding and in general, American's tendency would be to
shy away from this type of design.
Configuration III - The concept of the dedicated APU is the
most promising, provided that a completely different approach would be used
in the design, installation and the development program for such a system.
As noted in Section II of Reference 7, APU's are used a great deal more than
would be expected (or originally intended). Their lack of reliability,
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maintenance cost and high specific fuel consumption would dictate a
complete study to select the cycle, design and installation features
pertinent to such a system. There, of course, would be a potentially
even greater payoff in STOL aircraft which for noise reasons, must be
powered by higher bypass ratio (10 to 15:1) and where bleed extracted
from the main engines would be even more costly (on the order of twice)
in terms of impact on thrust and specific .fuel consumption.
Configuration IV is not acceptable to American at this time.
The cost of support of an internal engine generator (IEG), plus additional
spare engines (necessitated by more frequent engine changes caused by
the need for IEG removal/repair) would be quite high. The question on
oil contamination and its impact on the generator performance as well as
contaminations produced by a generator failure or engine failures, would
be a source of real concern.
In these Boeing studies, it was assumed that equal maintenance
costs would be involved on a total system basis for each configuration
studied. American believes that based on the material previously discussed,
this assumption was necessary in a study of this limited scope, but such
would obviously not be the case in real life, and more study is obviously
required.
American does agree with Boeing's preference for the dedicated
APU as showing most promise. American cannot support the recommendation
that all shaft power offtake is preferable over combined shaft and bleed
systems without significant further study. While drag^ and cruise SFC are
prime targets for making improvements in DOC, there appears to be greater
potential for improvements if the maintenance cost impact of the various
configurations were more realistically assessed.
The potential payoff from more detailed study of secondary
power systems is greater perhaps than estimated by Boeing. More detailed
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study of each of the systems is warranted with strong preference placed
on a thorough analysis of the dedicated APU^concept. Certainly the
airlines are paying a high price for having APU's on board aircraft.
No fault is found with the conclusion that large potential pay-
offs are available from the application of advanced technology to the
secondary power systems of future aircraft. More study is warranted,
but such studies must be adequately funded to insure that the assumptions
that are made will not erroneously impact, either positively or
negatively the results of the study. The reduction of maintenance cost
and cost of ownership and improved reliability are certainly equally
good targets as the reduction of cruise drag and engine SFC.
It is unfortunate that the economic costing methodologies
currently available do not lend themselves to this type of analysis.
It is, therefore, most important that suitable economic methodologies
be developed to insure an adequate assessment of the real and believed
larger potential available from such advanced technology programs.
In terms of priorities, American disagrees with Boeing. American
believes the dedicated APU approach warrants first priority treatment.
Such a unit would be the main power generating gas turbine for all
secondary power requirements during the total operating flight regime.
o GENERAL ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT
The information presented by the contractors falls into a
category that can be considered non-standard. • This does not mean that
the quality is in question. The nature of the problem to assess technology
potential required a deviation from the normal material presented in a
preliminary phase of development. On our part, it required an equal
departure from the norm. Several avenues have been followed in an
attempt to condense the information into a measure of impact to the air
carrier.
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A general statement that applies to all the applications of
advanced technologies is they must be translated, in some manner, into a
justification for investment.capital. The justification has unfortunately/ii
two, altogether distinct elements. One facet is the measure of
\
technological worth. The other is the value that must occur to make the
"investment worth the risk. The major thrust of the contractors was on
the first. Our review will attempt to touch on both.
.b MATERIALS
Application of all advanced materials, primarily composites,
share the common characteristics of higher cost. They also have the
same common goal of lighter weight. If the general relationship of
weight and operating costs is universally representative, it would be
reasonable to assume a change in one would be reflected in the other.
The contractors have effected the following weight savings.
Aircraft % Composite Used Weight Savings
TBC 640 10.15%
19. 0<4> 15.25%TBC 630
TBC 620
GDFW 90M 39.0 25%
GDEW 98M 41.0 28%
GLAC 95M 60.0 38%
(1) Percent of airframe structure.
(2) Percent difference between conventional and composite aircraft.
(3) 1981 delivery date
(4) 1985 delivery date
Another way of stating the savings is that for every 10 pounds
of conventional structure removed, 3.5 to 5.8 pounds of composite must
be introduced.
25
It should be recognized that the values reflect a 1972 time frame
and that a certain amount of weight reduction will occur in the normal
progression of technology. Thus the weight savings would be less than
above when compared to a future "conventional airplane."
Translating this into greater load carrying capability at a re-
duced structural weight, affects the economics of both airframe and
propulsion systems. The trade to be made is the cost of the replace-
ment material that results in the reduced weight. It is difficult to
assess all the manufacturing techniques or the potential operational
cost changes attributable to composite materials. The best approach
that we found was to translate cost and this amount of usage into a
measure of savings that must occur, to be at"least equivalent with pre-
sent technology equipment. This relationship is shown in Figures 13
and 14 for composites that were assumed to cost $60/Lb and $30/Lb
(compared to aluminum @ $l/Lb), respectively. The composite costs were
deliberately assumed to be very high, in relation to aaluminum, to
illustrate the sensitivity of total material costs to the price of
potentially high-cost exotic materials. The point to be made is that
other costs must be reduced to make the use of composites effective,
economically. If less material is required or waste is reduced, this
could make the advanced materials competitive. From the work contained
in the ATT reviews, it is not clear that a sufficiently in-depth study
has been made of this matter by the manufacturers.
If the assumption of $l/Lb for aluminum is carried further, an
estimate could be made for the cost at which composites would become
equivalent. This is predicated on an estimate-iof only the weight of
waste (raw) material in relation to the weight of a finished product.
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NO accounting for the effect on airplane cost of recovery/reuse of scrap
material, or of differences in manufacturing costs (e.g. machine tools,
forms, etc.) between aluminum and composites hassbeen made. Ratios of
the weight of raw material to finished goods, supplied by NASA, indicate
value of 8:1 and 1.4:1 for aluminum and composites, respectively. If
these are representative then composites would have to cost no more than
$5.71/Lb to result in equal material costs, with a finished product of
the same weight. If a weight savings of approximately 50% were effected,
the equivalent price could increase to about $ll/Lb. As stated earlier,
froth of these examples are referenced to a price of $l/Lb for oaluminum.
American Airlines is not aware of information that indicates the costs
Of composites will reach these levels (1972 $). Furthermore, it must
n .
fre remembered that al-utnitram actually costs 30c/lib not $l/Lb, in tine time
frame of the economic analysis presented.
' ° RAW MATERIAL MARKET
_
 p
_ RAW-MATERIAL .MARKET — . . - . .
The market price of the raw material will have a fundamental
influence on its introduction into aircraft structure.Ll Another
iflaterial, used extensively in aircraft$s.was traced in its raw state to
gain some insight into cost trends that could prevail for composites.
Aluminum cost and production trends are shown in Figure 15. In addition
to the cost of Figure 16, a.tsOil?,h.owncar-epOSSible inflation influences,
are essentially two aspects that are of concern.
First, there has been a price change of about 50% in aluminum,
price, in current year dollars, reached its low point around 1945
(drop in price by about 50% since 1920), then had an approximate same
order gain by 1970. There were many forces acting on the price changes
during this period which brings the second aspect of concern into focus.
27
During the period from 1915 to 1940, the production of alum-
inum showed a very slight increase..^  From the 1940 period to present,
the production rate has steadily increased. The major influence in
causing the price to come down during the early years, has probably ,3
been the increased technology. If the period around 1960 is observed,
it can be seen that a breakthrough in processing, drove the price down.
Although inflation is a factor, it would be difficult to attach a firm
quantitative value to this influence. From Figure 16, the general
trend in aggregate inflation can been seen. There are so many forces
acting on the economy both domestically and internationally, that it
is difficult to isolate any one.
0
 COMMENT
If the analogy is made that any future material, such as com-
posites, will follow similar trends, then it must be assumed that the
price will fall and rise through relatively the same changes. This
will probably not be the exact case. The conclusion to be reached is,
that a general downward cost trend may be balanced by an opposite in-
flationary trend. It should be recognized that the price changes in
aluminum did not occur over as short a time period as is being projected
for composites (1975-1985). Even though there is an indication of lower
composite costs in the near future, this optimism may be eroded by the
forces at work in the general economy,
o INVESTMENT
The airplane investment as seen from the air carriers point
of view is basically the flyaway price and the cost of spares. Here,
only the flyaway cost is considered because every airline, depending on
the size of the fleet, would require provisioning at different levels.
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From the manufacturing standpoint, the cost of research and manufacturing
represents the investment.
A method of looking at the relative cost of the ATT candidates
was to use thennumber of seats being purchased as a common base. It was
difficult to establish the exact list of equipment that would be considered
in the flyaway price of the ATT aircraft. It was, therefore, assumed that
the ATT investment would fell somewhere between the basic price and the
price which includes buyer furnished equipment. This relationship is
summarized in Figure 17. The manufacturing costs are listed in Table 5.
The increased speed and lower noise has resulted in a higher
product cost, which was expected. An exception is found in the GDFW ATT
candidates, which because of much lower R&D estimates, resulted in a rela-
tively lower investment per seat (see Figure 17 and Table 5). If the use
of composites does translate into lower R&D costs, the benefits to the
air carriers are obvious. There are programs, at present, that carry a
much higher R&D estimate for just engine development, which make the R&D
costsoappeareespecial-lyp'lowsinhthetGDFW case. Based on present develop-
ment costs, it appears that the investment for an ATT candidate is rela-
tively greater than present technology aircraft that provide basically
the same service (excluding noise). This only means that the operating
cost must be lowered to make the additional investment cost effective.
0
 OPERATING COSTS (ATT CANDIDATES)
The direct and indirect operating costs as approached by the
manufacturers (TBC, GDFW & GLAC) are primarily predicated on the price
and weight of the vehicle. A direct approach to costing, such as this
may appear like a simple means to circumvent a rather difficult and
complex analysis. To a certain extent, the difference in operating
costs that implicitly result from investment and weight changes may
reflect the benefits derived from the particular technology introduced.
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The formula approach to predicting costs of equipment in fleet operation
today has resulted in unexplained differentials. These differences (i.e.
747 actual reported cost versus formula cost), in varying degree, result
in understated costs. There may be definition problems, or the coefficients
may merely reflect the time period in which the formula was based. In any
case, for projecting costs, present formulas are inadequate.
The formula as discussed is based on an accurate statement of
weight and price. There can be found a general relationship between
these parameters and operating costs. To the extent that the relation-
ship is linear over small ranges of either weight or price, the result-
ant change in operating cost can be assumed to be directly proportional
to the former. This has been the implicit assumption made by the manu-
facturers and is the point of departure taken by American Airlines.
The following is an exaiaple of differences that formulas can induce.
747 DIRECT MAINTENANCE
Example
Annual Cost£Resuiting From: 1972 Dollars
NASA 1970 Formula $15,026,171
AA Formula $17,016,836
AA Actual $17,983,000
It can be seen that even the formula used in American Airlines'
early estimates of the 747 costs did not result in exact predictions.
This is merely one reason for being cautious when using a formula approach.
Using the data for both the direct (DOC) and indirect (IOC)
costs, from the manufacturer without adjustment, a profit margin was
established. The results are shown in Figures 19A, 19B, 19C, 20 and
21. These figures reflect, in a general manner, the potential of advanced
technologies.
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.,_/ As mentioned previously, it is advantageous to establish a
margin between the structural and volume limited payload. Figure 19A,
19B, 19C presents the reason for the margin.^ The greater the difference
between the amount of payload required to cover costs (in this example
DOC) and the "upper payload limit", either the structural or space
limited weight, the more potential profit an aircraft has available.
A way of presenting this margin can be in an envelope,.as shown in
Figure 20. In this figure, there has been introduced the element of
IOC to reflect an actual profit margin. The "profit margin envelope",
(expressed in the number of passenger potentially available for profit),
when compared to present fleet aircraft, show gains accruing to the ATT
aircraft solely due to the increased range. On average trip lengths
typically experienced by American Airlines (1500-2500 KM), the DC-10
and 747 show a greater potential. To illustrate the relative profit
available, a 3218 KM stage length is used strictly as an example in \_J
Figure 21. There are several significant points to be brought out
which can best be made in outline form.
A. The profit potential of a 747 and DC-10 exceeds ATT candidates of
similar payload and range on a 100% LF. passenger payload basis.
B. The profit potential of a 747 exceeds that of the GLAC, ATT aircraft
at 50% LF., but the DC-10 has a lower or equal potential with'similar
ATT vehicles.
C. If the configuration of the 747 were changed to 398 seats, simulating
that of the GLAC ATT aircraft, the profit potential would increase,
still exceeding the ATT vehicle, (see Figure 21).
D. If the configuration of the DC-10 were changed to 195 seats, the
profit potential would be lower than the similar ATT aircraft
(see Figure 21).
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E. If the DOC estimated by formula were optimistic by 20%, the profit
potential of the 195 seat ATT candidates would be equivalent to the
DC-10 with the same seating configuration.
0
 COMMENT
In general, the ATT vehicles in the,195 seat configuration,
have better profit margins than a similar present technology aircraft
with the same simulated seating, such as a DC-10. The opposite is true
when comparing the 398 seat GLAC ATT aircraft with a simulated 398 seat
747. This could be interpreted as the 195 seat ATT design being com-
petitive with present technology aircraft while the large higher seating
capacity aircraft are not. This is not how American Airlines views the
results. These results merely point out the need for a closer defini-
tion and projection of costs.
0
 TECHNOLOGY IMPACT (ATT CANDIDATES)
Using the same ground rules as in the aforementioned discus-
sions, an operating cost benefit attributable to advanced technologies
was applied to the 747 and DC-10. Those costs, within American Airlines'
accounting system, that can be defined as direct, were used as a base
line from which to apply the various advanced technology "cost deltas".
This appeared to be a reasonable approach since detailed cost in the
ATT work was not readily available in a form necessary to make an in-
depth survey. The comparison is made on a TOC basis and reflects changes
only in the DOC portion. All other costs (ilel IOC) were held constant.
There are certain accounts such as depreciation that would be influenced
by the manufacturing cost differences discussed in the various ATT re-
ports. The results, therefore, assume no manufacturing cost reduction
or increases.
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0
 GENERAL ECONOMIC IMPACT
Spread of Technology Impact
TOG
C/ASK c/ASM
Base Line Aircraft - DC-10 1.3560 (2.1820)
°Technology Impact
.^cVr,z& 'iG£> \£?£a£t-
Base Line Aircraft With:
Supercritical Wing 1.3366-1.3388 ((2.1506-2.1541)
Composite Materials 1.3300-1.3378 (2.1400-2.1526)
Active Control System 1.3426-1.3450 (2.1602-2.1654)
This summary is an example of the range of cost reductions
that could occur if each technology category were implemented exclusive
of the others. Again this excludes any manufacturing cost cahnge. If
the total of all the technologies were applied, it is estimated that
the TOC's would be reduced by about 370 to 67o. It must be emphasized
that this represents a rather broad picture of range rather than exact
levels. A closer review was made of one aircraft design that resulted
in a more definative answer to the question of technology worth.
0
 TECHNOLOGY PAYOFF
A close examination has been made of selected technologies
as they affect primarily a 0.90 Mach aircraft. Data were used exclu-
sively based on the ATT studies .produced by GDFW. Two additional
studies (reference 5 and 6) were used to supplement the original ATT
work. From these data, an impact on cost and profit accruing from
advanced technologies was estimated.
The review cases that form a base from which increments in
costs, attributable to selected technologies were derived, are presented
in Table 7A. From the manufacturing and operating cost information,
was calculated an incremental change, isolated for each of the three
basic technologies, - materials, supercritical aerodynamics, and systems.
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Also essential was a brief look at engine technology to complete the
general review. The impact on the airframe economics is the primary
goal' of this contract. However, without an engine assessment, the
analysis is somewhat incomplete.
All costs and investment values were placed in the 1972 time
frame. This was accomplished to better reflect more current values and
to compare, on a relative basis, the results with a current in-service
aircraft of similar design (DC-10). A common set of assumptions were
chosen for all ATT cases and the DC-10. Only the flyaway cost was con-
sidered as an investment. This eliminated any spares provisioning from
the analysis. Although the DC-10 is used in a comparative manner, its
use is restricted to primarily a bench mark.
A measure of an aircraft's efficiency is its contribution
to the fleet mix. In some way the aircraft's profit contribution is
a measure of competitive economics. The measure, however, must be
subdivided into its basic elements to allow a better examination of
the aggregate movement, whether it be cost or profit. It is the
change in each sub-account that will be of concern in evaluating ad-
vanced technologies.
Each of the study cases were broken down into the major DOC
sub-accounts defined by GDFW. The DOC for DC-10 considered the same
divisions. The only point that needs reiterating is that future work
will require an even more in-depth economic review, both in method and
costing elements.
0
 COMMENT
The movement of each major cost sub-account is shown in
Figures 22 thru 27. A change in DOC, accruing to a particular tech-
. nology is displayed with its partitions. Each account (i.e. crew, fuel,
-. ••-**•--.... •-.,,.
" • • . . . ' ' > '
'-
!
 maintenance, etc.) and its relative position with'the. others, can
readily be seen. As previously mentioned, it was necessary to add the
engines to the list of advanced technologies (this-.fB'eing required be-
VT.V. :ff
cause of the influence on the aggregate DOC'). Figures 22 and 23 show
the effect of 1978 and 1982 time frame engine technology on aircraft
built of aluminum or composites ,(4070) .colheretisaanf increase inj fuel-con-
cost reductions become relatively less, which is a . ?';V/•;•!•<--;':* , f **» •""'.•*'-.',*,
- .,.£"3^'E lower noise levels. If engine efficiencies were'sim-^ '-:^ .^
sumption by as much as 8.6% (see advanced airframe materials case). Using this
case as an example reveals the effective D.O.C. change. If only the advanced
engines (1978 and 1982) are introduced into a (40%) composite airframe, the
D.O.C. change is approximately -0.6% to 4.8%. The primary reason is noise.
A goal of 10 and 15 EPNdB noise reduction from the FAR 36 level, limited the
contribution of advanced engines to the overall economics. When reviewing
the other figures, the engine aspects should be kept in mind. Almost in
every case, the progress in advanced technologies reflects a benefit with the•
exception of fuel costA __ -
As there is a progression from the 1972 to the 1982 time
frame, the fuel
direct result of
proved or the noise*induced defficiency reduced, the aggregate effect
on DOC becomes'fobyious.
A second comment is on the contribution of technologies and
refers to the crew and insurance accounts. The incremental benefits
.•shown may not occur. It is difficult to predict the crew and insurance
cost of an advance*technology aircraft. If it is considered a more
sophisticated vehiclej' the costs may be relatively more than present
aircraft. Crew pay 'is not necessarily based only on speed and weight
as some formulas might indicate. Similarly, insurance is not a direct
functib'n\pf ,the hull price.
; : ;'«V«, • " -
. •* . - r. i
•••.•'';£-.The final comment on the DOC increments is in the airframe
maintenance area. Since there are price and weight changes in the com-
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parative cases, there is a resultant difference in operating costs.
This difference, however, is based on a formula that may not be re-
sponsive to the underlying change. It is reconized that a change is
effected by use of lighter material and that there is a cost-weight
relationship. There is, however, no evidence that repair, material
cost, system design etc. will actually follow the general trend, As
mentioned earlier, there has been the implicit assumption that over ^
small increments this is true. To gain a sharper perspective, main-
tenance costs must be analyzed in much greater depth. Maintenance,
both airframe and engine, intthe time period of this discussion (1972)
.r\
accounted for 29% of the American Airlines operation cost. The air-
frame was about 50% of this amount. Without a closer definition of
both airframe and engine maintenance, an investment in advanced
technologies is not on a firm foundation. A summary of all the cases
studied is contained in Figures 28 and 29 for a general comparison.
0
 PROFIT
'Finally, it is necessary to translate the cost data into
the profit potential. To do this, the IOC was determined, for various
load factors (passenger only) and applied to the DOC. A common yield
was used in all the cases from which the operating costs were taken to
produce a potential profit. The relative profit margins accruing from
advanced engines, materials, supercritical aerodynamics, and active con-
trol systems is presented in Figures 30 thru 33. All the study cases
.'/?>
are summarized in Table 8. In all comparisons, the advanced technolo-
gies indicate a greater profit potential. The breakeven load factor
is lower, while the margin with full passengers is higher. The DC-10,
which is used as a bench mark, shows a greater margin throughout the
range of L.F.'s. The breakeven load factor is 35% for the DC-10, while
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it is 37% for the advanced technology aircraft. The interesting point
is that this represents about 93 and 73 passenger for the DC-10 and
ATT .90 Mach aircraft, respectively. In other words, the advanced
technology aircraft would have a profit advantage until the upper
limit of 195 seats was reached. The reason for citing this example is
to point out the problem of proper sizing of an aircraft to a particu-
lar market size. If a ranking of the discussed advanced technologies
were to be accomplished, it should have as an index base, a conventional,
.82 Mach, 195 seat aircraft. American Airlines has estimated the
characteristics of such an aircraft and established a general index of
profit impact of the technology areas studied. The index, based on a
scale of 4, is as follows for the airframe related elements only:
AIRFRAME PROFIT INDEX
Composites 4.0
Supercritical Aerodynamics 3.4
Active Control System 0.6
The above represents a ranking of isolated technologies
measured by profit potential, related to a 195 seat conventional .82
Mach aircraft.
0
 COMMENT
The conclusion reached, using exclusively the GDFW data base,
is that the use of composites and supercritical aerodynamics establishes
an almost equal benefit. The active control system has such a small
margin, that the investment risk would probably be considered very high.
One further factor must, however, be stated. All the economics discussed
were devoid of full in-depth study of the detail design and maintenance
aspects of the major technology areas. A potential has been shown, but
the validity rests on the "cost-weight" relationship.
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POTENTIAL TECHNOLOGY IMPACT AREAS i
One criticism, prevalent throughout the review of advanced
technologies is the lack of attention to the basic impact areas. The
economic behavior, in a gross manner, has revealed potential cost
savings leading to increased profit margins. Benefits were premised
primarily on weight and price change. The general theme has been the
advantage of one approach or element to another. The other facet would
be the standard or target that advanced technologies would be required
to meet to be economically viable. A. perspective should be gained into
the areas in which technology will or could have a significant impact.
To accomplish this, American Airlines has made an extensive as possible
survey of its present fleets to determine what areas could be affected
by advanced technologies. This was to serve two purposes; one to es-
tablish the areas that can be directly affected by technology advances
and secondly present a relative measure of the investment worth. The
second purpose is an attempt to establish the relative magnitude of
the cost area to be effected by research investment. If the operating
cost of some particular area (e.g. stabilizers) is relatively small
when compared to other categories, it would not be prudent to expend
large sums to effect a change. So to extend the ATT study, it was
decided to review current fleets and determine what areas could be dir-
ectly affected by advanced technology study.
First, to gain a perspective of where the operating costs go,
the same base year (1972) that has been used previously was reviewed.
An average was developed that combines all AA fleet type aircraft. The
distribution of costs into their major categories is shown in Figure 34.
Considered as a direct technology impact area is the maintenance and fuel
categories which account for over 50% of all operating costs. These costs
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are defined as a "potential advanced technology impact area". Within
this area about 14% of the costs are directly related to airframe and
systems. Fuel, engine and maintenance burden make up the remainder of
the expenses. The concern in this review has been the airframe and
will be focused on {to^  investigate the potential technology impact.
Along with current fleet aircraft a conventional and advanced technology
study case vehicle^was borrowed from the earlier discussed GDFW work
(reference 6) as a bench mark.
The relative size of the airframe maintenance costs compared
to the total DOC is shown in Fig-ure 35. This summary chart places in
perspective, the area which can be directly affected by design changes.
Another way of viewing the roperating cost is in relation to the invest-
ment. This allows for an estimate of operating costs. A ratio of cost
to investment for the airframe remains within a rather narrow band for
all equipment as seen in Figure 36. Figures 35 and 36 are used to
illustrate the size of the airframe category in relation to the total
DOC for the selected current and ATT aircraft. It should be:noted that
the operating cost per unit of investment (Figure 36) appears greater
for the ATT aircraft, in the maintenance category, than present fleets.
This emphasizes the need for a better definition of projected costs.
It would be best at this point to outline the approach that
American Airlines took to place in perspective the airframe oriented
operating costs. From the accounting records of the fleets of aircraft
types shown in Figures 35 through 39, a sample of expense information
was extracted. General expense categories were examined and classified
into what was defined as "PRIMARY" and "SECONDARY" technology impact
areas. It should be remembered that only the airframe associated costs;
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are being addressed which account for about 7.2% of all direct operational
costs. The two general categories (Primary and Secondary) have eleven
major expense divisions each. Within each of the eleven major divisions
are hundreds of sub-accounts. Each sub-account has three elements;
1) material, 2) labor and 3) contracted services expense. The major
expense divisions in the primary and secondary classifications are as
follows:
POTENTIAL TECHNOLOGY IMPACT AREAS
PRIMARY SECONDARY
Autopilot System Inspection - Aircraft
Communications Systems Inspection-Instrumentational,
Radio & Radar
Electrical Power Systems Turn-Around Check
Flight Control System Termination Check
Landing Gear Periodic Check
Navigation System Instruments - Calibration,
Oper., Accept. Check
Airborne Auxiliary Power Warranty Credit - Aircraft
Fuselage Air-Condition System
Nacelles & Pylons Equipment & Furnishings
Stabilizers Fuel System
Wings Hydraulic Power System
-L' The selection of the categories was based upon recurring cost
or problem areas presently being experienced by current fleets and sub-
jectively by potential problem areas that may occur from the introduction
of advanced technologies. Several years of data were reviewed. However,
because of time constraints, only 1972 time frame information was placed
in the final form presented in this report.
As mentioned earlier, a sample of cost data was taken from the
accounting records. All information will be referred to that sample
with an inference to the aggregate system. Figures 37 and 38 reflect
the size of the two categories. The primary categories account for about
55% to 65% percent of the material costs on established fleet types
(i.e. 707-300 and 727-200). On relatively new fleets, such as the 747
and DC-10, the range of primary costs is about 65% to 75%. The remain-
der of the costs are composed of the secondary and an undefined miscel-
laneous category. The accounts not traced that were considered miscel-
laneous contain such items as cabin repairs, cleaning of parts, movie
system, trouble shooting, etc. These accounts could have been considered
as a third category, but the task of recovering cost data was already
sizable. The general hypothesis being followed is that a change made
in those areas directly effected by design research (i.e. Primary
technology areas) would cause a similar deviation in the secondary
categories. In other words, if a better design were implemented, not
only would perhaps the material or labor cost in repair be reduced, bttt
so would the inspections, checks, calibrations, etc. Whatever is done
to the primary areas will be reflected in the secondary. The purpose
of the divisions is to gain some perspective into the relative magnitude
of the operational costs in specific areas.
The labor "expense" was established on a "non-cost" basis.'
This was done to place the labor aspects on a generalized foundation.
Projection can be made on a manhour basis and translated into cost with
any desired labor rate. It was the intent to determine the manhours
required to accomplish a task and set this as a goal to better. The
relative manhours required per ramp hour for thepprimary category re-
presents about 35% of the total manhours expended in the mature fleets
(707 and 727). For the 747 and DC-10 this value is about 53% and 25%
respectively (see Figure 38). In both the material and labor classifi-
(
cations, the 747 and DC-10 are probably not fully representative of a
mature fleet.
On an aggregate basis the sum of material, labor andr contracted
services for the primary categories account for about 40% to 43% of the
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of the direct costs. The 747 and DC-10 primary costs represent about
59% and 52% respectively. Again, the latter aircraft may not reflect
a mature fleet. One very interesting observation (see Figure 39) is
that if the primary costs are adjusted for the APU, the ramp hour costs
in the primary category are reduced by 12% to 5270.
In each of the figures (37, 38 and 39) there is a "bench
mark" that represents the sample size. This represents the sum, measured
in 1972 dollars, of expenses sampled related to the total direct airframe
costs on an annual basis. There is no overhead attached to any of the
values discussed.
0
 RANKING OF POTENTIAL PRIMARY TECHNOLOGY AREAS
Taking into account the size of the sample and the preliminary
nature of the study, a ranking or a relative costcimpact.was prepared.
The ranking takes the form of relating each of the major accounts that
comprise what has been defined as the primary technology area, to the
sample of expenses extracted. This comparison is presented in Figure 40.
As seen from this figure, the accounts form a picture of the relative
impact of the selected expense categories. Where exceptions exist
(immature fleets) they are noted by symbol. Making use of statistical
inference it can be stated that the ranking is representative of the
fleet. By making this projection from the sample to the total system
}
of expenses, it can be argued that the sample is not fully representative.
This report will not attempt to rigorously defend the stated position.
There has been quantitative data presented, however, that supports and
established a standard. Future studies must include a heavy emphasis
on "systems" as exhibited by the first four categories shown in Figure
40. Many conclusions can be drawn from the information presented.
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0
 COMMENT
The major conclusion is that there must be a considerable
amount of study into the economic impact of advanced technologies into
the sub-system levels. Only after knowledge is gained about the deri-
vation of expenses can be meaningful change be effected.
0
 GENERAL COMPARISON - CONVENTIONAL AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AIRCRAFT
A general review of price and cost trends of conventional air-
craft was made in an attempt to correlate conventional and advanced
technologies. This was accomplished to a) illustrate the foundation
upon which formulas are derived and b) place a perspective on some of
the dilemma imposed in assessing advanced technology benefits.
}
A general relationship among operating costs (DOC), flyaway
price, and seats purchased is contained in Figures 41 and 42. The
mean, in all cases, is biased by American Airlines' data because of
knowledge of substructure composition. The flyaway price reported by
other airlines is included (see Figure 41) to establish a band. This
merely points up the variation in price as a result of configurations
purchased. Borrowed from earlier technology payoff discussions are
the conventional and advanced technology study aircraft (Cases I and D).
Case D represents a full technology aircraft (1978 Engine) with the
exclusion of active control systems. The performance and economic
characteristics closely resemble the MACH 0.90 original GDFW ATT phase
II study aircraft. Figure 43 introduces a fourth element - weight.
Now there is a general relationship of DOC, flyaway price, seats, and
empty operating weight (EOW). The data shown represents actual annual
averages (1972) and the study cases (D & I) were based on a certain
set of assumptions (see figure 7A and 7B). The DC-10 is adjusted for
the same conditions. All flyaway prices were escalated to the base year
(1972) by the same index (see Figure 41) for consistency.
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In all instances the study Case I (conventional .82 M aircraft)
does not match the established trends. As seen, the investment value
and DOC appear high. Adhering to the premise that the absolute levels
are not representative, but the differentials do reflect benefits, places
the advanced technology vehicle into the "scatter band" of conventional
aircraft prices and operating costs. There are, in fact, several
conclusions that can be reached that are best stated in conjunction with
the summary information presented in Figures 44, 45 and 46. The general
conclusions are listed below.
(1) If the design and cost estimates for the ATT 0.90 M
"full technology" aircraft are representative of a
commercially saleable vehicle, then the DOC is $40/RH
greater than general trends and $122/RH greater than a
trend based on the study base assumptions (see Figure
44).
(2) If the manufacturing and operating cost differentials
accruing from technology are representative, then the
investment per seat is $6,800 lower (-$1.3 Million
fly-away price) for the ATT 0.90 M aircraft and the DOC
r
is $100/RH less. (see Figures 44 and 45).
(3) If the manufacturing cost is absolute and the DOC dif-
ferentials are representative, the net effect is a
$0.7 million dollar fly-away price increase and a $87/RH
decrease in DOC. (The $100/RH savings is reduced by an
increase in depreciation of $13/RH. The net effect is
$87/RH): (See Figures 44 and 45.)
4,4
(4) If the relationship between the number of seats and
E.O.W. is representative, then the conventional study
base aircraft (CASE I) E.O.W. is too low by 12,700 KG
(28,000 Ib). If the operating cost differentials are
again assumed representative, then an ATT 0.90 M
aircraft would have an increased E.O.W. of 12,700 KG
(28,222 Ib) yet have a lower operating cost by about
$100/RH. (See Figures 44 and 46.)
In general, there has been found differences between trends
established by historical data and projected conventional designs.
This, it is believed, raises questions about the derivation of both
conventional and advanced technology projections based on a formula
approach. More importantly, the resultant margins in operating costs
and fly-away price place the advanced technology aircraft within the
boundary of present technology fleet costs. In the example used, the
aggregate DOC reduction was about 9% while the fly-away price was about
117o lower for an ATT .90 M aircraft. The question that must be asked
is; do these margins represent a meaningful reduction for the investment
risk?
4:5
CONCLUSIONS
o ECONOMIC
1. Costing Methodology
The operating cost predictions made for the ATT aircraft were
formed from derivatives of the Air Transportation Association
(ATA) 1967 and the Lockheed 1970 IOC formula approach to expenses.
The differences that can occur have been shown to be 207» to 30%
different than actual recorded costs for equipment in present
service. If these differences translate to ATT aircraft cost
projections, the forecasts eould be subject to major errors. It
is for this reason that work must be done in the area of costing
methodology to better form a foundation upon which projections
can be made.
2. Design Optimization (Economic Input)
The manufacturers' approach was to maximize Return on Invest-
ment (ROI), and/or minimize operating costs in conjunction with a
particular design approach. This method is, in itself, probably
a good approach to designing an economically viable product.
However, the foundation upon which the economics are formed is
questioned. If one of the elements of cost is off by 10% or 20%
and this amount is spread over the projected lifetime of the
vehicle, the induced error in ROI is obvious. A design parameter
optimized on ROI, that may not reflect true operating cost, will
lead to misrepresented optimum designs.
3. Operating Cost -Benefits
Cost reductions resulting from technology benefits were based
on a formula approach. The formula has as its two major elements,
weight and price. A misquote of either element produces an
erroneous absolute operating cost level. • In theory, the change
in operating cost, if over a small enough range, represents the
"delta" expenses occuring because of the weight or price. This
can only be true if the difference being reflected is a function
of the two primary elements of the equation-weight and price.
Although operating costs, to some degree, correlate with weight
and price changes, the reflected changes have not been substantiated
to a degree upon which future massive investment decisions can be
based.
i4. Propulsion
A closer support between the engine and airframe sides of the
project would have produced a better aggregate product. The
parametric sizing of engine and airframe is productive to a point.
Upon arrival at a preliminary configuration, reflective of the
desired end goal, an effort must be made to define closely, the
engine characteristics. Without this definition, the cost aspects
attributed to the propulsion sector of the aircraft economics are
on a poor foundation.
The one most disturbing element attributed to the engine
technology is the increase in fuel consumption. This, coupled
with future fuel cost increases, places a question on advanced
engine technologies. It is believed that if more effort were made
in the propulsion aspects of the program, the results would have
been improved.
5. Investment Risk
An investment decision is based on the best economic information
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available in the time frame in which a conclusion must be reached.
The judgment is not always made on exact criteria. A margin is
sometimes established to reflect the risk element because the
expected benefits may be somewhat lower than predicted.
The ATT economics were based on formulae that do not reflect
many technical and business uncertainties that often exist during
the decision making time period. For these reasons, it is
subjectively concluded that a much larger margin in operating
costs than was apparent from the manufacturers' ATT studies is
required to offset the erosion of benefits historically
encountered by the airlines.
6. General
Based on the economic analysis and reservations expressed in
the preceding five conclusions, the economic benefits of advanced
technologies have not been conclusively demonstrated one way or
the other.
o TECHNICAL
1. 0.98 Mach Cruise
The higher speed candidates did not result in additional
trips when placed in a "real network" environment, although the
use of a .98 Mach cruise aircraft over a 5000 n. mi. range
exclusively (i.e., every trip being long range) shows such
potential. However, the present and foreseeable future networks
do not reflect such an average trip length. For these reasons,
the higher speed did not result in less aircraft than present
fleets, or increased utilization, for the same service pattern.
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2. Composite Materials
From the standpoint of profit potential, the introduction of
composite materials into airframes indicated the maximum benefit.
This is due primarily to the weight reductions. If the operating
costs for airframes escalate without regard to weight savings
beyond present levels (not reflected by the "formula" expenses),
the economics will erode. This also is true for manufacturing
costs.
3. Supercritical Aerodynamics
As in the composite materials case, the economic benefits
primarily accrue to weight reductions. If the cost reductions
are representative, then the profit potential of supercritical
aerodynamics is about equal to composite materials. The ranking
of benefits for all the technologies, it should be emphasized,
»
was predicated on the potential profit impact to an air carrier.
4. Active Control Systems
The cost effectiveness of ACS was not readily apparent from
the economics presented. ACS can only be considered of marginal
value.
5. Subsystems
Although the ACS did not result in a significant cost change,
the question of system economics was explored. From this analysis
it is concluded that cost reduction must rank high in priority.of
research needed (see Figure 38). The methodology used by the
manufacturers to assess the economics, as stated, was not
considered adequate. It is concluded that benefits accruing to
systems, in general, need to be explored in much greater depth.
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6. Secondary Power Systems
Advanced secondary power systems indicate a potential economic
benefit. The systems, in their present concept, are not of the
reliability standard necessary. A dedicated secondary power
system will become a flight critical item with the same reliability
requirements as primary propulsion units. In the context of the
ATT studies, this area warrants considerable study.
•50 *
RECOMMENDATIONS
With regard to the aforementioned conclusions, the following is recommended:
1. An in-depth study of airframe and engine manufacturing methods to more
closely define weight and cost benefits and trades' needs to be
initiated.
2. Along with manufacturing costs, there is a need to establish in-service
operating costs both for short and long range projections.
3. To establish the "real" economics of composite and supercritical
aerodynamics, the technologies showing the greatest profit
potential, a full scale wing should be built and flight tested on a
transport category aircraft with well established baseline
characteristics. Normal aerodynamic/engineering test data should be
obtained. The wing should then be flown in simulated airline
service (prior to certification) with a representative accumulation
of flight cycles and flight hours.
4. An in-depth design and economics study is required in all systems
categories to establish the value of incorporating advanced
technologies in future aircraft. This study should include a
complete review of the basic present and advanced design philosophy.
5. Noise being an increasing burden in future aircraft places emphasis
on research into structural sound absorbing materials.
6. Along with sound absorbing materials, research should be initiated
to define optimum airplane/engine configurations for noise reduction.
7. Within the framework presented in the ATT studies, the dedicated
power- unit concept warrants considerable design and economic review.
8. Development of hardware for the promising technologies should
continue with heavy design emphasis on reliability and maintain-
ability. All new technologies should be flown in simulated airline
service, with representative accumulations of flight cycles and
flight hours prior to being introduced into production aircraft.
9. When radically different (new) aircraft types such as in ATT are
considered in the future, a "systems" study of integrated fleets
(existing/conventional plus new types) should be made, rather than
simply studying the new airplane types without regard to the
mutual effects of old fleets and new fleets.
10. Future NASA airplane R&D programs involving both airframe and engine
should be integrated into one program management (as the SST was
done). This is essential because in actual practice it is the
airframe manufacturer that will coordinate the activities associated
with the efforts necessary to produce a commercially saleable
product.
11. A general recommendation is that NASA should specify a uniform
format for a comparative study such as the ATT. This would provide
for a much more comprehensive critique in that less time is spent
placing everything on a common base.
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TABLE ,2/i
BELLY. CARGO AND BAGGAGE DENSITY AVAILABLE
FOR WEIGHT LIMITED PAYLOAD
(100% PAX LOAD)
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ATT Aircraft
, Containers & Bulk (1)
Kg/M3 (Lb/Ft3)
M
tt
Boeing .90M 150.6 (9.4)
.95M 100.9 (6.3)
,98M 96.1 (6.0)
GD .90M 22.4 (1.4)
.98M 24.0 (1.5)
GLAG .95M 52.9 (3.3)
GD* .90M 86.5 (5.4)
GD* .98M 94.5 (5.9)
* Assumed weight limit payload = 60,000 Lb,
Conventional (Current) Aircraft
B-747-123
DG-10-1G
DC-10-30
B-707-323B
CV990A
411.7 (25.7)
157.0 ( 9.8)
371.7 (23.2)
272.3 (17.0)
382.9 (23.9)
Cargo
Containers & Bulk
Kg/M3 (Lb/Ft3)
147.4
83.3
76.9
3.2
4.8
20.8
75.3
. 84.9
(9.2)
(5.2)
(4.8)
(0.2)
(0.3)
(1.3)
(4.7)
(5.3)
517.4 (32.3)
155.4 ( 9.7)
442.2 (27.6)
333.2 (20.8)
539.9 (33.7)
Cargo
Containers Only (3)
Kg/M'
269.1
112.1
104.1
4.8
24.0
25.6
104.1
495.0
820.2
243.5
688.9
NA
NA
(Lb/Ft3)
(16.8)
( 7.0)
( 6.5)
( 0.3)
( 1.5)
( 1.6)
( 6.5)
(30.9)
(51.2)
(15.2)
(43.0)
( NA )
( NA )
o Structural Payload = WLPL
o Number Pax = N
o Psgr. Payload = Wp = 77N Kg (170N Lb) „ ,
o Baggage Load = Wb = 14N Kg (30N Lb) @ 160 Kg/MJ (10 Lb/FtJ)
o Cargo & Baggage Density = p
o Container Volume (Baggage) = Vbg
o Container Volume (Cargo) = Vex
o Bulk Volume (Cargo) = Vbk
(1) P =- WLPL - N
(2)
Vbg + Vex + Vbr
pc = WLPL - (Wp + Wb)
(Average Density, Baggage & Cargo)
(3) PCX =
Vex + Vbk
WLPL - (Wp + Wb)
Vex
Actual available cargo densities would be slightly more than shown above
because cargo would not be loaded in a baggage container that was not full.
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TABLE
SPEED CHARACTERISTICS
Cruise Mach No.
(Entry Into
Service) (1973)* Mmo
Current Aircraft
747-100 .86 ** .84 .92 .97
DC-10-10 .85 ** .83 .88 .95
707-323B/C .82 .82 .90 .95
727-223 . .85 .82 .90 .95
707-123B .85 .82 .90 .95
ATT Aircraft
***
Boeing - .90 .90 .95
Boeing - .95 .95 1.00
Boeing - .98 .98 1.03
GDFW - .90 .90 0.95
GDFW - .98 .98 1.03
GLAC - .95 .95 1.00
* Further reductions may be scheduled as a result of fuel conservation program.
** Original Plans, Not Used
*** Minimum Required MD, Based On FAR 25.335
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TABLE ,5
Development Costs
Investment
(1970 $)
R&D(3) (000,000)
TBC 640
630
620
GDFW 98
90
500.256
554.700
601.829
387.100
330.760
GLAC 95 750.448
Unit Cost $ (000,000)
200 Aircraft
TBC 640 (4)
630
620
GDFW 90 <5)
98
R&D(3)
$2.501
2.773
3.009
1.654
1.935
Mfg.u;
$11.828
12.884
13.843
11.306
12.264
Total*-1)
$14.326
15.657
16.852
12.960
14.200
R&D(3)
$1.251
1.387
1.504
0.827
0.968
400 Aircraft
Mfg. (2)
$10.374
11.269
12.089
10.133
11.232
Total (1)
$11.625
. 12.656
13.593
10.960
12.200
GLAC 95<6) 3.752 29.877 33.629 1.876 25.150 27.026
(1) No profit.
(2) Includes engine.
(3) R&D Air frame only.
(4) Note Schedule A
(5) Note Schedule B
(6) Note Schedule C
TBC 1970 $ (000,000)
SCHEDULE A-l
58
Non-Recurring
TBC-640
$500.256
TBC-630
$554.700
TBC-620
$601.829
Airfraine Cost $/Aircraft
200 Units $12.341
400 9.640
Engine(3) 1.985
Total Aircraft Cost
200 Units 14.326
400 11.625
Non-Recurring $/Aircraft
200 Units . 2.501
400 1.251
Manufacturing Cost $ /Aircraft^)
200 Units 11.828
400 10.374
$13.540
10.539
2.117
15.657
12.656
2.773
1.387
12.884
11.269
$14.559(2)
11.300
2.
16.852 (3)
13.593
3.009
1.504
13.843
12.089
For 1972 $ escalate per --
(1) 1972 $ 10.2% escalation
(2) " 8.0%
(3) " 8.3%
(4) Includes engine.
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SCHEDULE B-l
GDFW $ (000,000) (1970 $)
GDFW 90 GDFW 98
R&D (exc. tooling) $235.460 $279.700
Tooling 95.300 107.400
Total R&D (non-recurring) $330.760 $387.100
.98 Aircraft Price^1^ 200 Units @ $14.2 2840.00
(P.124, Vol. I) 400 " @ 12.2 4880.00
(P.115, Vol. I) 250 " @ 13.33 3333.49
.90 Aircraft P..118 250 Units @ $12.09 3022.10
Assume Same $?) 200 " @ 12.96 2592.00
as .98 Aircraft 400 " @ 10.96 4384.00
Manufacturing & Support Cost
200 Aircraft 2261.24 2452.90
250 2691.34 2946.39
400 4053.24 4492.90
Manufacturing Cost/Aircraft^)
200 units ($ M) 11.306 12.264
250 10.765 11.785
400 10.133 11.232
R&D Write-Off/Aircraft
200 1.654 1.935
250 1.323 1.548
400 0.827 0.968
(1) Includes engine.
(2) Assumes same distribution of costs
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SCHEDULE C-l
GLAC 95 (1970 $) (000,000)
Unit Cost $/Aircraft
UNITS 200 400 567 800
Production Cost 29.877 25.150 22.475 20.251
Write-Off R&D 3.752V1) 1.376 1.330 0.938
Total Production Cost 33.629 27.026 23.805 21.189
Profit 4.371.—! 3.513 3.095 2.755
Aircraft Price 38.00ti—> 30.539 26.900 23.944
% Profit (i.e. of price) ll.SOS^f) 11.503 11.50558 11.506
% Profit (i.e. of cost) • 12.9986 13.0015 13.002
$750.448 (MX
C 2- ""*(i2) Assumed ^Ln(T"applied~to $38M for profit.
TABLE 6
PROFIT POTENTIAL (at Maximum Passenger Payload)
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2000 St. Mi. Segment -
Maximum Potential
Pax'1'
126.48 $/Passenger @ 6.324? Yield
:(2)Profit
TBC 640
630
620
GDFW 90
98
151
153
151
142
142
GLAC 95
DC10
747
236
171
259
152
131
204
19098
19351
19098
17960
17960
29849
21628
32758
Profit $
17960
16569
25802
(1) (2)
(DC10-ATT)
$2656 $3668
2277
2530
3668
3668
5059
(747-ATT)
2909 6956
(1) Derived from costs as represented by the manufacturer.
(2) D.O.C. adjusted by 20% to simulate the difference between formula
and actual costs.
50% L.F.
TBC 640
630
620
GDFW 90
98
GLAC 95
DC10
747
53
i5
30
44
69
41 6703 5186
5692 4300
3794 632
5565
8727
Simulated ATT Configuration for 747 and DC10
$(1138) $379
(127)
4933
1265
8095
Maximum Potential
DC10
747
50% L.F.
DC 10
747
132
271
35
72
16695
34276
4427
9106
(195 Seats)
(398 Seats)
(195 Seats)
(398 Seats)
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TABLE 7A
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW CASES
CASE
A
B
C
/
D
E
F
G
NOISE LEVEL
FAR 36
FAR 36
FAR 36-10
FAR 36-10
FAR 36-15
FAR 36-15
FAR 36-15
MACH
0.90
.90
.90
.90
.90
.90
.90
AIRFRAME
ALUM.
G/E +
ALUM.
G/E +
ALUM.
G/E +
+ S/C
S/C
+ S/C
S/C
+ S/C
S/C
ALUM + S/C
ENGINE
JT9D
JT9D
STF429
STF429
STF433
STF433
STF433
+ ACS
H
I
J
FAR 36-15
FAR 36
FAR 36
.90
.82
.85
G/E +
+
ALUM.
ALUM.
S/C
ACS
+ S/C
STF433
JT9D
JT9D
DC-10-10 FAR 36 •83 ; ALUM.
Economic Study Assumptions
Average trip length 1000 mi. (1150 St.Mi.)
Annual utilization 3650 Ramp hours
No spares investment
Cost and revenue were escalated to 1972 $
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TABLE ?7/B
STUDY INVESTMENT BASE
(1972 $) l
ATT STUDY .CASES
CASE .
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
PRESENT TECHNOLOGY AIRCRAFT
AIRFRAME & SYSTEMS FLYAWAY PRICE
DC-10-10 . $14,773,000 $17,082,000
AIRFRAME & SYSTEMS
$10,808,390
9,962,434
10,698,934
9,820,131
10,415,232
9,533,962
10,317,493
9,382,57-2
10,983,128
10,519,691
FLYAWAY PRICE
$13,926,447
12,920,002
13,834,762
12,790,079
13,133,573
12,087,374
13,004,112
11,931,549
14,114,818
13,486,433
1 INVESTMENT ESCALATED FROM BASE YEAR BY:
IMPLICIT PRICE DEFLATOR FOR PRIVATE
PURCHASES OR PRODUCERS' DURABLE
EQUIPMENT. AIRCRAFT INDEX; SOURCE:
SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS JULY,'70,
'71, '72, and '73.
,-l"-\
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TABLE 9
COST ,S UMMARY,
Total Fleet
(Direct Labor, Material, and Contracted Services)
1972
65
707-323B •707-323CC ,727-200 , 747-123 DC-10-10
AIRFRAME AND OTHER FLIGHT EQUIPMENT: (Direct Only)
$/RH
C/ASM
C/ATM
54.81 52.23 49.24 143.03 75.33
0.0981 0.0944 0.1153 0.1034 0.0835
0.6155 0.7260 0.8635 0.6310 0.5595
D.QiC. (Including Maintenance'Overhead):
$/RH 904.82 898.20 711.75 1929.97
D.O.C. (Excluding Depreciation & Rental):
$/RH 706.48 693.69 564.92 1246.16
MAINTENANCE COST (Including Cyerhead):;
$/RH 206.04 232.85 207.66 527.52
1316.19
906.58
355.50
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TABLE 10
COST PER $. INVESTMENT
ASSUMPTION:
AVERAGE TRIP LENGTH, 1150 ST. MI.
UTILIZATION 3650 RH/YR
AVERAGE TRIP RAMP TIME 2.75 HR (.82 M A/C)
1972
Number of Seats
707-323B
138
707-323CC
138
727-200
124
747-123
380
DC-10-10
254
AIRFRAME & OTHER FLIGHT EQUIPMENT
 :(birectlOnly)
10 RH/DAY UTILIZATION
$/RH .(3.6.50"
DOC
$/RH
 :(3j550.)5
DOC/$ INVEST
•
DOC/A/C INVEST^3)
"5"
$200056
0.02559
56658
$190639
0.02438
56658
$3302593 $3278430
0.4224 0.4193
0.3640 0.3614
$179726 $522059 $274954
0.03188 0.02588
45675 53078 58161
$2597887 $7044390 $4804093
0.4609 0.3492 0.3252
0.3924 0.2984 0.2812
CASH EXPENSES
$/RH (3650)
-;"l)OC/$ INVEST (2)"
"
$2578652 $2531968 $2061958 $4548484 $3309017
0.3298 0.3238 ." 0.3658 0.2255 0.2240
.2842 0.2791 0.3114 0.1929 0.1937
MAINTENANCE (Including Overhaul)
$ 752046$/RH '(3650);
-DOC/$ INVEST
;DOC/$ A/C INVEST^3?
0.0962
0.0829
$ 849902 $ 757959 $1925448 $1297575
0.1087 0.1345 0.0955 0.0878
0.0937 0.1145 0.0816 0.0759
(1) First Three Quarters of 1973 indicates this value will be
approximately 0.02835.
(2) Investment - Airframe and Systems only.
(3) Investment - Aircraft including Engines.
TABLE 11
MATERIAL COST SUMMARY
(AIRFRAME AND OTHER FLIGHT EQUIPMENT)
1972
67
FLEET
AVERAGE 707-323B 707-323CC 727-200 747-123 DC-10-10
AIRFRAME
$/RH
C/ASM
C/ATM
19.15
CO .038
0.228
18.33
0.026
0.188
^ii,95
0.022
0.173
C ;. 14/90 / " ~
~~ '":.'.' 07035 >
""67263"
45.42"
0.033
0.199
27 766
0.030
0.203
OTHER FLIGHT
EQUIPMENT
$/RH 3.04 4.61
C/ASM 0.006 0.007
C/ATM 0.036 0.047
3.41
0.006
0.049
2.63
0.006
0.046
4.62
0.003
0.020
3.03
0.003
0.022
TOTAL
$/RH
C/ASM
C/ATM
22.15
0.044
0.264
22.94
0.033
0.235
15.36
0.028
0.222
17.53
,. 0.035 .
6.309
50.04
0.036
0.219
30.69
0.033
0.225
TABLE 12
MATERIAL COST SUMMARY
SUBSYSTEM SAMPLE
(AIRFRAME AND OTHER FLIGHT EQUIPMENT)
1972
68
707-323B 707-323CC 727-200 747-123 DC-10-10
SAMPLE
$/RH
C/ASM
C/ATM
.--v-^- TV- -_
'•' 9 91 *
,015 25
.11134
r 11.62?
.02059
.15842
ru^
763256
.24306
-j"26.00- -"•
. 01445
.08823
ri5T5t:
.01719
.11521
PRIMARY TECHNOLOGY CATEGORY
$/RH
C/ASM
C/ATM
6.44
.01023
.07233
7.45
.01320
.010161
7.82
.01832
.13720
12.83
.00927
.05660
11.84
.01313
.08800
SECONDARY TECHNOLOGY CATEGORY
$/RH
r^/ASM
C/ATM
2.45
.00388
.02748
2.74
.00486
.03742
2.10
.00491
.03677
2.35
.00169
.01035
1.05
.00116
.00780
MAJOR TECHNOLOGY CATEGORY
$/RH4f
C/ASM
C/ATM
8.89
.01411
.09981
10.19
.01806
.13903
9.92
.02323
.17397
15.18
.01096
.06696
12.89
.01429
.09580
PRIMARY AS 7= SAMPLE .64 r9_77o
SECONDARY " " " 24.68
MAJOR " " " 89.65
64.147o
23.62
87.76
56.457c
15.13
71.58
64.157,
11.74
75.89
76.387o
6.78
83.16
SAMPLE AS 7» FLEET
COST 43.197, 75.657o 79.067o 39.967, 50.537,
TABLE 13
LABOR REQUIREMENT SUMMARY
(AIRFRAME AND OTHER FLIGHT EQUIPMENT)
1972
69
707-323B 707-323CC 747-200 747-123 DC-10-10
SUBSYSTEM SAMPLE
SAMPLE
PRIMARY TECH. CATEGORY
SECONDARY TECH. CATEGORY
TOTAL MAJOR CATEGORY
SAMPLE
PRIMARY TECH. CATEGORY
SECONDARY TECH. CATEGORY
TOTAL MAJOR CATEGORY
"SAMPLE
PRIMARY TECH. CATEGORY
SECONDARY TECH. CATEGORY
TOTAL MAJOR CATEGORY
PRIMARY AS % SAMPLE
SECONDARY AS % SAMPLE
MAJOR CAT. AS % SAMPLE
SAMPLE AS % FLEET
FLEET MAINTENANCE
MH/RH
MH/ASM
MH/ATM
M/H/RH
2.22
0.83
0.79
1.62
35.0
13.0
13.0
248.0
93.0
• "89..0
182.0
37.4%
35.6
73.0
57.7%
3.85
.: £172"
432.3
2.86
1.06
0.95
2.01
M/H/ASM
50.1
18.8
16.9
M/H/ATM
386.0
145.0
130.0
275.0
37 . 1%
33.2
70.3
62 . 9% •
4.55
X 8 2 . 2
2.86
1.00
0.96
1.96
67.2
23.5
22.5
505.0
176.0
168.9
344.9
35.0%
35.6
68.6
65.7%
4.35
102 .V<
632.0 763.3
1.20
0.64
0.48
1.12
8.6
4.6
3.5
53.0
28.2
21.2
49.4
53 . 3%
40.0
93.3
14.4%
8.33
"5870
353.4
2.22
0.57
0.63
1.20
24.6
L)6.2
6.9
165.0
42.1
46.7
88.8
25.7%
28.4
54.1
42.2%
5.26 I/
K'58.0'-;-
390.6
-/ Includes Warranty Labor Credits - Projected for 8 MH/RH on a Mature Fleet
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TABLE 14
AIRFRAME MAINTENANCE COST SUMMARY
SUBSYSTEM SAMPLE
(DIRECT LABOR, MATERIAL, AND CONTRACTED SERVICES)
1972
707-323B 707-323CC 727-200 747-123 DC-10-10
SAMPLE
$/RH
0/ASM
C/ATM
32.25
0.0512
0.3621
35.99
0.0638
0.4909
35.67
0.0835
0.6255
66.71
0.0482
0.2943
39.33
0.0435
0.2921
PRIMARY TECHNOLOGY CATEGORY
$/RH 12.78 15.39 16.04 39.09 20.61
C/ASM 0.0203 0.0273 0.0375 0.0282 0.0228
C/ATM 0.1436 0.2097 0.2812 0.1724 0.1531
SECONDARY TECHNOLOGY CATEGORY
$/RH 8.63 10.01 9.12 13.92 6.86
C/ASM 0.0137 0.0177 0.0213 0.0100 0.0076
C/ATM 0.0969 0.1365 0.1598 0.0614 0.0510
MAJOR TECHNOLOGY CATEGORY (PRIMARY & SECONDARY)
$/RH 21.41 25.40 25.16 53.01 27.47
C/ASM 0.0340 0.0450 0.0588 0.0382 0.0304
C/ATM 0.2405 0.3462 0.4410 0.2338 0.2041
PRIMARY AS % SAMPLE 39.64% 42.75% 44.98% 58.59% 52.41%
SECONDARY AS % SAMPLE 26.76 27.81 25.56 20.86 17.45
MAJOR AS % SAMPLE 66.40 70.56 70.54 79.45 69.86
SAMPE AS % FLEET 58.83 67.61 72.44 46.63 52.00
ADJUSTED FOR APU
SAMPLE $/RH
PRIMARY TECH. CAT. $/RH
33.80
14.18
49.36
21.74
28.35
9.63
71
TABLE 15
POTENTIAL ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY STUDY^AREAS
SUBSYSTEM SAMPLE
(AIRFRAME COSTS AS PERCENT OF SAMPLE)
1972
(2)
CATEGORY 707-323B 707-323CC 727-200 747-100 DC-10-10V '
PRIMARY TECHNOLOGY CATEGORIES
AUTO FLIGHT 2.09% 1.84% 1.59% 1.77% 1.54%
ELECTRICAL POWER 4.61 4.73 3.17 1.38 3.39
FLIGHT CONTROL 5.13 5.84 6.64 4.15 1.76
.NAVIGATION- 6.05 5.26 2.91<3) 5.93 5.45
AUXILIARY POWER -NA- -NA- 5.24 26.01 27.92
COMMUNICATION 0.46 0.74 0.36 3.49 0.39
FUSELAGE 0.75 1.82 2.87 0.08 0.88
NACELLES & PYLONS 0.23 0.75 0.50 0.39 1.01
STABILIZERS 0.48 0.66 0.70 (1) 0.13
WINGS 1.40 2.98 2.07 3.78 0.73
LANDING GEAR 18.41 18.19 18.93 11.63 9.20
PRIMARY AS % SAMPLE 39.64% 42.75% 44.98% 58.59% ' 52.41%
SECONDARY AS % SAMPLE 26.76 . 27.81 25.56 20.86 17.45
MAJOR AS % SAMPLE 66.40 70.56 70.54 79.45 69.86
SAMPLE AS % TOTAL FLEET 58.83 67.61 72.44 46.63 52.00
(1) NEGLIGIBLE AMOUNT
(2) DOES NOT REFLECT A MATURE FLEET
(3) NO INERTIA NAVIGATION SYSTEM
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FIGURE
STRUCTURAL EFFICIENCY
640
630
620
90
98
95
EOW
LB
159550
171292
184840
127935
144128
282376
PL(Str.)
LB
55450
49710
49160
40000
. 40000
84802
MZFGW
LB
215000
221000
234000
167935
184128
367178
PL /EOW
LB
.3475*
.2902
.2659
.
.3126
.2775
.3003
J
707-323B
DC10 - 10
DC10 * 30
747 - 100
CV-990
GDFW 90
98
147500
237722
254900
363212
122448
127935
144128
46500
72778
82300
161288
37552
60000
60000
194000
310500
337200
526500
160000
187935
204128
.3153
.3061
.3228
.4040
.3067
i*
.4689\*
.4163 f
* Design criteria assumed 1.5 x pax PL.
Contractor Report.
** In service EOW.
*** Initial specification EOW.
Note Vol. I, P.305 of
11/73
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FIGURE 18
COMPARISON OF ACTUAL AND
FORMULA D.O.C.!S
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* ACTUAL COSTS WERE ADJUSTED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS
MADE BY THE CONTRACTORS IN THE FORMULA APPROACH
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FIGURE 40
AUTO
ELECTRICAL
POWER
yC*T T OM'I*J? M -L-Wn. 1.
CONTROL
NAVIGATION
AUXILIARY
POWER
COMMUNICATION
SYSTEM
FUSELAGE
NACELLE &
PYLONS
STABILIZERS
WINGS
LANDING SEAR
0
POTENTIAL ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY STUDY AREAS
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30 — NOTE: CASE I CONV.
CASE D
25 —
20 —
FLYAWAY
PRICE
$
(000,000)
15 —
10 —
5 __
MEAN
LOWER BANS
O AA EQUIPMENT
X RANDOM SELECTION
OF CARRIERS AND
EQUIPMENT TYPE
DURABLE EQUIPMENT DEFLATOR -
AIRCRAFT USED TO ESCALATE PRICES
0 — I
100
I
200
I
300
(
400
SEATS
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FIGURE
CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT
GENERAL RELATIONSHIPS
400 —
300 —
SEATS
200 —
100 —
CASE I
CASE D AD
0 — NOTE: CASE I CONV. A/C
CASE D ATT A/C
2000 —
D.O.C.
$/RH
1000
0 _
CASE I
CASE D
I
100
AA MANUAL AVG.t!)S
•0- DC10 ADJUSTED FOR
STUDY ASSUMPTIONS
I
15050   200 KG
100 2C)0 §300 400 LB
EMPTY OPERATING WEIGHT (000)
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• FIGURE (53)-
CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT
(GENERAL EXPENSE AND INVESTMENT RELATIONSHIPS)
2000 —
D.O.C.
$/RH
1000 —
~\
CASE I
CASE D
O — ACTUAL 1972 COSTS
•©- — ADJUSTED TO STUDY ASSUMPTIONS
80 _ -NOTE: CASE I CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT
CASE D ATT AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT
FLYAWAY
PRICE
$/SEAT
(000)
70 _
60 _
MEAN
50 _
a CASE I
CASE D UPPER
BAND
BAN®
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